Beyond Territorial Disputes --Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific--

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Outline:

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- (1) Japan's interest
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- 4, Pressing Tasks for ASEAN on Maritime Security
- 5, Japan's cooperation with the ASEAN and the ASEAN countries

What are taking place at sea in Asia?

- 1, Tension increased in East China Sea and South China Sea: becoming flashpoint of global consequence
- 2, Territorial and Maritime Boundary Disputes
 - *Disputes over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas
 - *fully fledged islands + dozens of atolls, sandbanks and reefs
- 3, Many countries involved:
- *China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, (Indonesia)
 - *"External" powers: The US, Japan, India,
 - * China's expanded claim: "Nine-dash Line" (no definition)
- 4, Major Shipping Route passing through the disputed areas

- 4, Militarization:
 - *(Heavily armed)vessels deployed
 - *Clashes happened frequently
 - *Arms modernization(Submarines acquisition)
 - * Rapid expansion of China's naval and air forces (Island-construction, military bases?)
- 5, Mutual distrust and rising nationalism
 - * Hard positions, difficult to compromise
- 6, Efforts for tension reduction/dispute settlement
 - * Regional institutions(ASEAN related ones)
 - * Consultation for legally binding "Code of Conduct"
 - * Legal approach: Philippines UNCLOS arbitration use

Japan's interests in an Approach to Maritime Security

- 1, Not just disputes over territories(islands) and maritime boundary(resources)
- 2, The rule-based maritime order is at stake:
 - "three principles for the rule of law"
 - 1) to make and clarify claims based on international law,
 - 2) to avoid using force or coercion in resolving conflicts,
 - 3) and to seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. (PM Abe at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue)
- 3, Putting one of the highest priorities on SLOC safety in national security agenda ("2013 National Security Strategy")
- 4, Seeing ASEAN and ASEAN countries the important partners

Why ASEAN?: Structure of the international relations in Asia

- 1, Beyond the US-China relations
- (1) Power Transition theory: focusing on the US-China bilateral relations
- 1) US-China condominium(G2), Cold-war type of confrontation, US Hegemony, China's dominance
- 2) The US: not a full-fledged hegemon
- 3) China: not a full-fledged rising power
- 4) Many vulnerabilities internally and externally
- 5) Needs to get the support of "the rest of Asia"

The importance of the "rest of Asia"

- (1) Many countries having substantial economic, political and military powers in Asia
- (2) They have substantial bargaining powers in the "great game"
- (3) Policies of the "rest of Asia" will have grave impacts on the future of Asia
- (4) ASEAN: A critical player in this game (PM Abe's visits to the ASEAN countries)

Pressing Tasks for ASEAN on Maritime Security

- 1, Sharing and sustaining universal rules and norms regulating maritime affairs
- (1) Maritime affairs have to be addressed according to the universally endorsed rules and norms(UNCLOS)
- (1) Ocean is not a "blue land(藍色国土)."
 - 1) Subject to the international rules and norms
- 2) COC in South China Sea: should comply with the international rules and the principle of freedom of navigation

2, Capacity-Building of the ASEAN countries

(1) Resorting to the unilateral coercive measures (Talk peacefully but act aggressively)

(2) Gaps in maritime capability are widening among the claimants

(3) Peaceful negotiations is difficult without substantial maritime capabilities

3, An Alternative to ASEAN-China Code of Conduct(COC) in South China Sea

- (1) Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Indo-Pacific
- (2) The ongoing ASEAN-China negotiations on COC go nowhere.
- (3) Alternatives:
- a) "ASEAN COC" first, then open accession to outside countries

 * ASEAN's experience: TACTAC(Treaty of Amity and
 Cooperation)"

- b) Using the Indonesia's proposal on "Indo-Pacific version of TAC"
- * Items to be inserted into COC could be put into "Indo-Pacific version of TAC"

Japan's "Pivot" to Southeast Asia

(1) Strengthening the ASEAN-based regional institutions
Sharing international rules and norms, capacitybuilding, joint operations(anti-piracy and natural disaster)

- (2) Enhancing bilateral cooperation
- 1) Upgrading law enforcement capability (providing coast guard ships and training, joint exercises bilaterally and multilaterally)
- 2) Deep involvement of the Japanese Coast Guard(JCG)

(3) The US-Japan Alliance in Southeast Asia

1) Strengthening the alliance (US-Japan New Guideline for defense cooperation, new security registrations etc.)

2) Continue to provide security common goods for regional peace and stability in Asia

3) More cooperation with the ASEAN and the ASEAN countries in security capacity building

(The US-Japan 2+2 Joint Statement in October 2013)

(4) Strategic Use of ODA

1) ODA-funded support to enhance maritime law enforcement capability of the ASEAN countries

2) The Provision of the coast guard ships (Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam ...)

3) Training programs and seminars sharing common understanding

(5) <u>"Defense Diplomacy"</u>: Involvement of the Ministry of Defense(MOD) and Self-Defense Forces(SDF)

 Engaging in capacity-building, military joint exercises and high level defense talks with the ASEAN countries

2) Established a special division in charge of supporting capacity-building in the MOD

New senior post(vice-minister level) in charge of international security in MOD

(6) "Networking"

1) Constructing a network of like-minded countries' coast guards/defense agencies/armed forces in the region

2) The 2010 Defense Guidelines says the necessity of constructing a security network with US allies and ASEAN countries.)

- (7) Policy Review: the arms export ban policy
- 1) Strictly prohibited the export of military equipment and technology
- 2) Dec 2011 the arms export ban policy was relaxed; *allowing Japan to sell/provide military equipment for peaceful and humanitarian purposes
- 3) Apr 2014 the Cabinet decision
- *New principles adopted: not exporting to countries involved in conflicts and those violating UN resolution

5, New areas of security/defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN countries

- 1) Procurement of defense equipment and collaboration of defense industry
- 2) Training military officers
- 3) Japan-ASEAN 2+2 dialogue
- 4) Cooperation to strengthen ISR(Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities of the ASEAN countries

